⚡ CFB Dashboard

These thoughts on Texas A&M football are going to be confined to last night’s 35-6 loss to LSU. 1. A&M came out with starters in three new spots in the offensive line on Saturday night. They were obviously trying to ramp up the run blocking by getting their best run blocking tackle into the lineup. More importantly (and I will get to this later) they were attempting to shore up things on the inside. You can’t say that A&M won’t change things up in order to try to get better, and they should be commended for that. However, this included a first time starter making his debut on the road in a hostile environment in what was a must win game for the Aggies. The new left guard has played right guard almost exclusively in his career and so this was a new position for him as well. It was a learning experience for the right tackle (three pressures allowed per Pro Football Focus, two penalties) and you wonder how stressed A&M was to do all of this on the road as opposed to waiting a week, trying this experiment out at home versus a terrible Arkansas team, and then having the first road game be a far less stressful experience at Missouri. You don’t win must win games with people who haven’t played in those types of games. 2. A&M tried to get QB Marcel Reed going last night. They started him off with a quarterback draw and they tried to run the ball on first down and establish a physical mentality. Unfortunately, they often defaulted on second down to putting the ball in Reed’s hands in the passing game. Last year, people forget that A&M won in Baton Rouge for the first time in 30 years because the offensive coordinator took the ball out of Reed’s hands in the second half of that game (he threw two picks in the first half). He handed it off to Rueben Owens or on jet sweeps to Mario Craver and threw a screen to Jamarion Morrow. This year, A&M kept trying to get him going even when his protection (as usual) wasn’t holding up. A&M’s only scoring drive of the first half should have disabused anyone of that notion as Reed’s only completions on the drive were to Craver (who basically converted a third and 13 all by himself on a screen). Otherwise, he mixed in three incompletions to everyone else and a couple of scrambles. A&M tried to get him going by putting him back in with 12:15 left after he threw an interception. It wasn’t even about winning the game….it was simply about trying to fix him by giving him more reps even though he couldn’t make the ones he had work. He went one of three on that drive and A&M had to punt. It was the polar opposite of the approach that A&M took last season. It was also reminiscent of the approach that A&M took in 2024 versus the Tigers when quarterback Conner Weigman was dropped back over and over and left to implode instead of being given easy things to do. Not only that, when A&M finally played backup Brady Hart…who needs all of the throws and reps he can get given Reed’s issues….he threw an interception. Instead of doing what they did with Reed and continuing to have him throw the ball, they promptly shut Hart down and had him hand it off the rest of the game. All in all, a very inconsistent approach on how to handle multiple quarterbacks who are struggling. 3. A&M’s defense played mostly man coverage last night even though they rarely blitzed. In contrast, LSU manned the Aggies up as well but sent backers and safeties more often. They used five man rushes overloading A&M’s right side versus a first time starter at right tackle. They also sent someone up the middle with athleticism to put them in Reed’s line of vision (as well as making A&M’s new starters deal with trying to target the right people ). In other words, they weren’t going to allow Reed the time to get the ball down the field with his feet set from the pocket. They wanted him moving around because he is less accurate on the move and while he might escape and hurt you with his legs, he is less likely to make plays in the passing game down the field. In contrast, A&M decided that they weren’t going to let LSU run the ball which is admirable. They stayed in their rush lanes, tried to push the pocket, dropped ends into coverage to mix things up, and on third down went with their usual mix of rush/drop people on the line of scrimmage to attempt to confuse Sam Leavitt. It worked to an extent since LSU was 4 of 12 on third down. However, when LSU figured out that A&M was going to stop the run, try to keep Leavitt in the pocket, and mostly man the Tigers up, it started throwing deep crossing routes and making A&M defenders run across the field with their wideouts. They would get someone in the slot or in a reduced formation, they would start running, and the pass rush wouldn’t get there. The only way to speed LSU up was by blitzing because A&M couldn’t generate gut pressure from its tackles, its ends are push the tackles types, and when they went to their passing down packages they did not confuse the Tigers and get them to turn rushers loose. 4. A&M boss Mike Elko hides his mouth with play calls and so it looks like he is calling the defenses. Normally, combination coverages and man match principles allow defenders to pass potential targets to each other when they go across the formation (as opposed to defenders trying to run with them). However, A&M kept using robber and other coverages while not seeming to emphasize pressure and disrupt Leavitt’s timing. Hence Leavitt’s 312 yards on just 17 completions….8 of 10 for 235 yards on throws beyond ten yards. Elko went for it again on fourth and short inside his own 35 yard in the third quarter of a game he was trailing in. In every instance, the opponent has translated the stop into a touchdown. He basically decides that the game is going to be won or lost with 1.5 quarters left. This isn’t Mike Leach or even early Lane Kiffin gambling because they are offensive coaches and they trusted their offenses more than their defenses (and usually with good reason). This is a defensive head coach who chose the players for it running his scheme deciding that his unit isn’t going to hold up for the next 20+ minutes of game time. If your defensive head coach can’t trust the unit and scheme he created or can’t adjust in game to fixing what ails them…what are we doing here? The worst part is that in the Kentucky game I was like “Wow”. Versus LSU, I saw them keep the offense on the field, shrugged my shoulders, and acted like it was to be expected.